Vault
Security & cryptographic posture

Built so the worst-case
isn't catastrophic.

Centilio Vault is zero-knowledge by architecture, not by marketing. If our database is stolen, the attacker walks away with ciphertexts and a schema. Your secrets stay yours.

How keys flow

Five steps.
Four of them happen in your browser.

1

Master password

Stays in the user's browser memory. Never sent across the wire. Never written to disk.

2

Argon2id KDF

Memory-hard key derivation (m=64 MB, t=3, p=4) turns the master password into a Master Key. GPU- and ASIC-resistant.

3

HKDF → KEK

HKDF-SHA256 with org salt + info-tag derives a Key-Encryption-Key, also client-only.

4

AES-GCM-256 wrap

Each item gets a random 256-bit DEK. Items are AES-GCM-encrypted with the DEK; the DEK is wrapped under the KEK.

5

Server stores ct

Server receives ciphertext + wrapped DEK. Steals nothing useful if breached.

Full diagram in docs/architecture/crypto-zero-knowledge.md.

The crown jewels

What lives where —
and what protects it.

From our public threat model. No hand-waving.

AssetWhere it livesWhat protects it
Master passwordClient RAM onlyNever sent; KDF transformation
Per-item DEKsClient RAM (transient)Wrapped under KEK before persisting
Wrapped DEKs at restPostgres ciphers tableKEK is client-only; server can't unwrap
Login proofsBCrypt-hashed in DBBCrypt + login rate-limit
JWT signing secretServer env varNot in repo; rotation playbook
Audit logAppend-only DB tableService-role-only writes; hash-chain target
Posture, in public

What we've fixed.
What's still on the list.

We publish what's open as well as what's closed. Vague claims help nobody. Full ledger in docs/security/findings-log.md.

Closed (recent)

  • Auth filter bypasses (extension whitelisting) — 6 vectors closed
  • CORS wildcard for chrome-extension://* — closed
  • Hardcoded JWT fallback secret — closed
  • TRACE-level logging leaking SQL params — closed
  • application{,-dev}.properties shipped to prod — closed
  • hbm2ddl.auto=update silently rewriting schema — closed (Hibernate now in validate mode)
  • 6 React dangerouslySetInnerHTML XSS sites — closed
  • AdminToolServe column-name SQL injection — closed
  • MySQL driver hardcoded in PG-only DbConnection — closed
  • /user/public-key user enumeration — closed

Open + tracked

  • PBKDF2-100k → Argon2id KDF

    Migration in flight. Argon2id is the target; PBKDF2 is current. Rotation runbook exists.

  • TOTP secrets unencrypted at rest

    Tracked. Encrypting under user KEK in next quarter.

  • Criteria value-injection SQLi (R&D)

    Identified, fix queued. Not user-reachable today.

  • No JUnit harness, near-zero unit tests

    Test scaffold landing this quarter. Smoke tests in CI today.

  • No external pen test on record

    Vendor-gated. Engaging Q3 for first formal pen test.

Found something? Tell us.

We respond to security reports within 48 hours and credit discoverers in our public CHANGELOG.

Disclose privately

[email protected] — PGP fingerprint in SECURITY.md.

Email →

Read the source

Vault is MIT-licensed. Read the code, run the build, audit it yourself.

View on GitHub →

Threat model + posture

Public docs: threat-model.md, posture.md, findings-log.md.

Open docs →

Bring your security review.

Send us your standard vendor questionnaire. We answer it, share our threat model, and walk your team through the architecture. Honest answers, in writing.

Talk to a security expertView source

Or email us directly at [email protected]